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Abstract
To what extent geopolitical tensions in major oil-producer countries and unexpected news
related to the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) a¤ect oil price? What
are the e¤ects of non-market externalities in oil price? Are oil price forecasters aware or a¤ected
by such externalities when making their predictions? In this article, I analyse the inuence of
these events on oil price by means of Granger causality, using a unique measure of geopolitical
events accounting for supply disruptions for the 2001-12 period. I found evidence favouring OPEC
countries-related news as an oil price driver jointly with supply disruptions inuencing short-term
forecasts, and reducing the consensus when unanticipated news are available. When considering
separately OPEC news or other supply disruptions, the evidence is rather episodic.
JEL-Codes: C12; C22; E66; Q41.
Keywords: Oil-producer countries; OPEC ; Oil price; Granger causality.
Highlights: !What are the e¤ects of geopolitical tensions and non-market externalities in global
oil price?
!I found evidence favouring OPEC countries-related news as an oil price driver jointly with
supply disruptions inuencing short-term forecasts, and reducing the consensus when unanticipated
news are available.
!When considering separately OPEC news or other supply disruptions, the evidence is rather
episodic.
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1 Introduction
In this article, I analyse the inuence of geopolitical tensions and news related to the Organisation
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) events on Brent oil price for the (monthly) period
ranging between 2001.1 and 2012.3 using a unique ad-hoc variablelabelled GT&Nspecially built for
these purposes. Despite all the machinery that has been used in regard to OPEC behaviour, I proceed
considering one of the most striking time-series econometrics tools: Granger causality (henceforth,
Gc; Granger, 1969; 1980; 2003).1 Note that as emphasised by Barrett and Barnett (2013), Gc is a
tool designed to measure if an independent variable a¤ects another dependent instead of testing for a
specic mechanism.2
Three hypotheses are examined. The rst one analyses if the GT&N variable Gc oil price, and the
opposite should not hold if GT&N already measures (exogenous) unexpected oil-production-related
events. The second hypothesis analyses if GT&N Gc the oil-price forecasts released in the Consensus
Forecasts (CF) monthly report; again, expecting that the opposite should not hold. A third hypothesis
investigates if GT&N Gc the dispersion of mentioned expectations, as evidence of geopolitical tensions
a¤ecting the uncertainty surrounding future observations of oil-price realisations.
There are also proposed some robustness exercises. The rst one underpins a baseline concept in
regard to the use of forecasting CF outcomes (labelled as "auxiliary hypothesis"). This is, actual
observations of oil price Gc its own expectations, but the opposite should be rejected. Hence, this
result could be interpreted as evidence of CF survey as an e¢ cient forecasting procedure in terms of
the information used for making predictions.
Two natural extensions are also reported. The same set of hypotheses with the two components of
GT&N series: (i) considering just OPEC-related news, and (ii) the baseline measure but excluding
the events associated to OPEC. It is also included a recursive estimation of the validity of these
hypotheses across time.
The results are in favour of OPEC-related news as an oil-price driver jointly with supply disruptions.
There is evidence supporting this claim by nding the abovementioned directions of Gc for the four
hypotheses. These results are obtained when considering all kinds of events in GT&N measure.
When considering just OPEC-related news, the results show bidirectional Gc between GT&N and
expectations dispersion. Finally, when considering the GT&N measure excluding the OPEC-related
events, all results are spoiled out carrying inconclusive results. Hence, the nding of OPEC as an
oil-price driver while statistically signicant in the baseline specication could not be considered as a
robust one. Some similar qualitative results are found in Smith (2005), Alhajji and Huettner (2000)
for the 1973-94 period for OPEC behaviour, and Almoguera, Douglas, and Herrera (2011).
There is a wide range of research analysing the oil market beyond the boundaries of Economics.
Perhaps, oil uniqueness for the energy matrix of industrialised economies and their remotely located
producers, attracts the attention of many elds with di¤erent viewpoints to analyse.
From an economic perspective, the understanding of any market relies hugely on the e¤ect of agents
behaviour on the equilibrium dynamics. Some specic cases, such as the oil market, would include
issues concerning industrial organisation, natural resources sustainability, externalities, and other
complexities a¤ecting its evolution. In particular, the oil market is characterised as a market with big
global playersin the supply and demand sidewhose behaviour more than often threatens the worlds
1This approach has been also used for similar purposes in, for example, Gülen (1996) and Kaufmann et al. (2004).
Another approach found in the literature is the event study as used, for example, by Demirer and Kutan (2010) and Lin
and Tamvakis (2010).
2This distinction is important since a huge literature focus on OPECs behaviour under several assumptions to indeed
test a mechanism. This article goes one step beyond OPEC behaviour while still circumscribing to oil market. However,
in order to proceed, I consider OPEC simply as one of many news generator devices without imposing any structure.
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production chain and even political and nancial stability. Moreover, big players from the supply side
carry the unpleased label of a worldwide recognised cartel (see Gülen, 1996; Gri¢ n and Xiong, 1997;
Jones, 1990; Kaufmann et al., 2004, and Brémond, Hache, and Mignon, 2012, for details).
Big oil producers, i.e. oil exporter countries, have taken a step further on their industrial organisation
by creating the OPEC. Established in Baghdad, Iraq, and e¤ective since January 1961, the main aim
of OPEC is "to coordinate and unify the petroleum policies of its Member Countries and ensure the
stabilisation of oil markets in order to secure an e¢ cient, economic and regular supply of petroleum
to consumers, a steady income to producers and a fair return on capital for those investing in the
petroleum industry." (OPEC, 2012). The organisation includes, as for 2015, twelve countries primarily
located in the Middle East and Africa, plus two Latin American members. As an organisation under
statutes, each member has to continuously full several requirements concerning production and
operations data reporting; a full commitment towards OPEC policy mandates. This obviously leads
to think of OPEC as a convenor into setting quotas, prices, or any other market distortion (Kaufmann
et al. 2004).
A lot of attention has been attracted to a particular OPEC conference scheduled twice a yearin regular
timeswhich outcome consists basically in a market quota setting for participant countries. There is
a lot of speculation in the days surrounding these conferences as, in principle, could be the main price
setting mechanism managed by OPEC. A long-standing research in this matter possibly begins with
Gri¢ n and Teece (1982), MacAvoy (1982), and Draper (1984), when analyse the e¤ect of meeting
outcomedecoded as an increase, no change, or decrease in quotaon oil-market based securities. A
similar aim is extended in Deaves and Krinsky (1992), Wirl and Kujundzic (2004), Guidi, Russell, and
Tarbert (2006), and Hyndman (2008) among others, plus some other OPEC issues such as reserves
(Taylor and van Doren, 2005, and Considine, 2006). The results achieve certain consensus when
quotas are reduced, and that the e¤ect on price has been declined since mid-1980s. Strong evidence
is found of OPEC as an oil price driver during the 1970s.
Besides the impact on the level, comprehensive literature also analyse the impact of OPEC news
into oil price volatility. Some examples are Deaves and Krinsky (1992), Horan, Peterson, and Mahar
(2004), Fattouh (2005), Lin and Tamvakis (2010), Aguiar-Conraria and Wen (2012), Cairns and
Calfucura (2012), Brémond, Hache, and Mignon (2012), López and Muñoz (2012), Schmidbauer and
Rösch (2012), and Mensi, Hammoudeh, and Yoon (2014) among others.
OPECs e¤ective power has been analysed thoroughly from an economic point of view by researches
and policy makers (Pindyck, 1978; Salant, 1976; Teece, 1982; Moran, 1982; Hochman and Zilberman,
2015). Many diverse events have occurred since OPECs establishmentmainly wars and political
instabilityand there is no current consensus about the role of OPEC as price setter (Loderer, 1985;
Smith, 2005; Fattouh, 2007). Most remarkably, Almoguera, Douglas, and Herrera (2011) suggest that
the ability of OPEC to set prices since its creation is rather episodic. The authors nd that during the
period from 1974 until 2004, OPEC acts similar to a Cournot competition when sharing the global
market with non-OPEC oil producers. Their empirical results, as the authors argue, are in favour of
specic but non-time-robust price rises due to OPECs comparison to the competition price level.3
From the demand side, it is unlikely that big consumers were trying to confront deliberately the
suggested OPEC behaviour. According to energy statistics from CIA World Factbook (2014), the
ten major oil consumer countries are: United States, China, Japan, India, Russia, Brazil, Germany,
Saudi Arabia, Canada, and South Korea. As the evidence on OPECs behaviour is inconclusive,
neither of this diverse list of countries has been associated specically against OPEC on a regular
3The OPEC behaviour analysed plainly as a cartel is also a long-standing issue in the literature. See, for instance,
Adelman (1982), Aperjis (1982), Teece (1982), Mabro (1986), Dahl and Yücel (1989), Gülen (1996), Alhajji and Huettner
(2000), Adelman (2002), and Fattough (2007) among others. As above mentioned, the results are episodic and dependant
on several assumptions previously made regarding OPECs held power.
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basis (obviously excluding Saudi Arabia, one of the major OPEC oil producer), despite the United
Nations World Trade Organisation (UN-WTO) surveillance for fair trade.
In terms of what extent OPEC sets prices and whether the e¤ects of non-market externalities in oil spot
price are questionable. It is also questionable if oil price forecasters being aware or a¤ected by these
externalities when making their predictions. All these questions are certainly important for a broad
group of policymakers, from global-based organisations to specic central bankers ghting imported
ination. Moreover, oil price is of special interest since there has been found detrimental e¤ects
attached to large unexpected shocks a¤ecting a number of stock indices (Hammoudeh and Eleisa,
2004; Hammoudeh and Li, 2004; Pollet, 2005; Malik and Hammoudeh, 2007; Driesprong, Jacobsen,
and Benjiman, 2008; Balcilar, Gupta, and Miller, 2015), and associated even to recessions (Hamilton,
2003, 2009). Oil price also carry a substantial amount of information to di¤erent international prices
indices a¤ecting global ination (see De Gregorio, Landerretche, and Neilson, 2007, Neely and Rapach,
2010, and Medel, 2015, for details).
However, it is a less clear cut if there are just OPEC newsas an organisationthe driver of oil price
shocks, or if it is necessary to include a more ample spectrum of supply disruptions such as political
instability, wars, or any other disruption due to non-market externalities. This is important since
certain OPEC countries have been subject of substantial geopolitical risk not necessarily a¤ecting
organisations countries only. For that reason, the particular concern of this article is consider OPEC
as one within many oil-market-based news-generator devices.4
The remaining of the article proceeds as follow. In Section 2 it is presented the Hsiao (1981) version
of the (augmented) Gc method, alongside the application to oil price and dataset. In Section 3 there
are presented the results for the baseline alongside the two robustness exercises. Finally, Section 4
concludes.
2 Econometric setup
2.1 Granger causality
The notion of Gc is as simple as usefuland di¤erent to "ordinary" causality. It states that if lagged
values of a variable xt predict current values of another variable yt, and that forecast includes lags of
xt as well as yt then xt Gc yt (xt ! yt). In this article, however, I make use of the Hsiao (1981) version
of Gc. This extension could be straightforwardly described as a joint signicance F -test of a whole set
of parameters associated to the independent variable (xt) that supposedly Gc the dependent variable
(yt). However, results derived from this baseline procedure may not be appropriate with xt-variables
with intermediate or short memory. Formally, this corresponds to test if all the lags of xt are jointly
statistically signicant in the following regression:
yt = +
pyX
i=1
iyt i +
pxX
j=1
jxt j + "t; (1)
where lags of yt controls for autocorrelation, f;;;2"g are parameters to be estimated (with, say,
ordinary least squares, OLS), and "t  iidN (0; 2"). The autoregressive orders (py; px) in Equation
(1) can be chosen according to an appropriate model selection criterion such as measures based
in the Kullback-Leibler information criterion (i.e. Akaike or Schwarz), or the General-to-Specic
(GETS) methodology. Statistical inference is carried out by testing the joint null hypothesis NH :
1 = ::: = px = 0 (xt do not Gc yt, xt 9 yt). The vector that contains the restrictions is F -distributed
4The analysis of OPEC as an organisation composed by several countries with high war risk is not as large as OPECs
analysis by itself. An exception is Bittlingmayer (2005). This article analyses whether country-level war risk a¤ect both
level and volatility of oil price alongside considering OPEC behaviour. The results reveal that these price movements
a¤ect stock prices. Hence, it gives a role to another kind of shocks despite those due to OPEC.
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with (px; T   (py + px + 1)) degrees of freedom (where T is the sample size). For a simple and rather
humorous example on the mechanics of Gc, see Thurman and Fisher (1988). A formal treat can be
found in Harvey (§8.7, 1990), Hamilton (§11.2, 1994), and Patterson (§8.5, 2000).
2.2 An application to the oil market
By means of Gc I provide evidence on the following hypotheses:
1. NH1: Do geopolitical tensions in major oil-producer countries and announcements concerning
OPEC countries (the GT&N variable) a¤ect the Brent oil price (POil)?
2. NH2: Do GT&N a¤ect oil price forecasts (E[POil])? and
3. NH3: Do GT&N a¤ect the consensus (E[POil]) of market analysts forecasts of oil price?
It is expected that NH1 : GT&N ! POil and NH2 : GT&N ! E[POil]. But, in order to conclude
about its reliability, the inverse should not be true for both assumptions. The inverse negative NH1,
POil 9 GT&N , supposes that the current oil price does not drive disturbances in oil-producers
countries. Also, if the expectations measure are orthogonal to oil producers information set, it
should be follow that E[POil] 9 GT&N . However, it is allowed for forecasters to consider actual
values of oil price as an indicator of future values. Hence, the following auxiliary hypothesis emerges,
ANH : POil ! E[POil]. Finally, associated with greater tensions is the uncertainty about future
values of oil price. For that reason, it is expected that GT&N ! E[POil], but the inverse should
not hold. Bowles et al. (2007) and Atallah, Joutz, and Pierru (2013) proposed a similar series when
measuring disagreement in ECB surveysrespondents.
Basically, these hypotheses are posed to test if oil-producer countriesgeopolitical tensions and unex-
pected news a¤ect oil price, its forecasts, and the consensus surrounding those forecasts. The analysis
requires a reliable (and simple) quantitative measure of geopolitical tensions and news measuring unex-
pected shocks about OPEC countries; as the GT&N variable already is. Some other simple measures
specically for OPEC meetings have been also used especially when using event study methodology.
Note that the analysis involves forecasters for two reasons. The rst one is the truly interest in
investigating to which extent they are a¤ected by GT&N in two typical dimensions: point and
dispersion of forecasts. The second reason is to stress the reliability of the newly-proposed GT&N
measure.
Some other robustness exercises comprise the use of the GT&N -O and GT&N -NO variables. The
former stands for purely OPEC-related news, while the latter for non-OPEC events. Hence, the
base GT&N variable is composed by adding up these two measures. Note, however, that given the
geographical proximity of the majority of big oil-producer countries, and the nature of the businesses
involved there (same exploited commodity with a very similar technology in a specic region), it is
di¢ cult to fully isolate both measures. Hence, it is not imposed an orthogonality condition between
them, preserving the benet of simplicity and easy-to-read results. This also supports the modelling
procedure when incorporating more than one lags to control for autocorrelation. Hence, the rst
lagthe most important when using GT&Ncomes from a bias-reduced estimation.
2.3 Dataset
The analysis is made considering a time span ranging from 2001.1 until 2012.3 (135 observations); in
monthly frequency. The GT&N is constructed by considering the sum of ten daily binary variables,
in which the value of one is assigned to an unexpected event. There are identied 188 events divided
into the ten categories of Table 1.
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Table 1: GT&N Components
No. No. events Classication Description
1. [10 ] Non OPEC UN Oil for Food Program (1995-2003)
2. [6 ] Non OPEC US relations with Libya and Iran (1996-2004)
3. [24 ] Non OPEC Iraq War and post-war period (2003-2011)
4. [10 ] Non OPEC Iran post Iraq War (start in 2005)
5. [21 ] Non OPEC Terrorist attacks
6. [8 ] Non OPEC Lebanon War (2006)
7. [25 ] Non OPEC Arab Spring (2011)
8. [2 ] Non OPEC Use of the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve
9. [16 ] Non OPEC New announcements on discoveries, and site exploration
10. [66 ] OPEC Purely OPEC announcements
Source: Authors elaboration.
In brackets are shown the number of identied events during the sample span. The last listed category
fully comprises the GT&N -O variable. When it is used the label "Non OPEC" means that not all nor
the majority of the events related to that category are plainly associated to OPEC actions. A more
detailed description of what kinds of events are included in each category can be found in Appendix A.
Daily individual-level identication, however, can be found in Annex A of López and Muñoz (2012).5
The sources of these variables are Bloomberg, The Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, and the US
Energy Information Administration. These ten variables are added to make a monthly variable which
contain an integer with the number of events and news. This variable is not transformed to a binary
one to preserve intensity.6
The oil price (POil) corresponds to the annual percentage change of the Brent oil price, measured in
USD per barrel (source: Bloomberg). The expectations (E[POil]) corresponds to the annual percentage
change of the 12-months-ahead forecast contained in the monthly CF report. The point estimator
reported in the CF report corresponds to the mean of the answers ranging 65-70 respondents. Each
report also shows the maximum and the minimum point value reported by respondents (E[pHigh] and
E[pLow], respectively). Hence, the di¤erence E[POil] = E12[pHigh   pLow]  E3[pHigh   pLow], where
E` is the forecast at ` months, measure the degree in which the consensus is achieved; the greater
the uncertainty, the smaller the consensus achieved. Hence, it is expected that GT&N ! E[POil].
Figure 1 describes graphically how the variable E[POil] is built and what is measuring.
Figure 2 exhibits all the variables considered in the analysis: oil price POil, expectations E[POil],
dispersion E[POil], and GT&N (as GT&N -O + GT&N -NO, in panel B). It is adverted a major
number of disturbances during 2001 (due to 9/11 terrorist attacks), 2003 (Iraq War), mid-2005 (due
to Lebanon War), and the 2011-12 period (due to Arab Spring).7 Note also that exogenous to all of
these variables, it is noticed the e¤ect of the nancial crisis of 2008-9 initiated after the bankruptcy
of Lehmann Brothers investment bank in the US.
Note also that the use of forecasting variables is made assuming that they are all the time minimising
some distance measure to actual values. To assess how reliable these predictions are, in Figure 3 it is
presented a birds-eye assessment of accuracy. In panel A, it is presented a scatter plotin this case,
the correspondencebetween the actual and forecast values (labelled "Brent P(Oil)" and "CF P(Oil),
h=12", respectively). Note that as the majority of observations lie close to the y = x line without
outliers, the forecasting accuracy could be considered of a good quality (Root Mean Squared Forecast
Error: 8.835; in levels, full sample).
5Note that the GT&N variable is available from 1999. So, the limiting part of the dataset is CF starting in 2001.
6This measure of geopolitical tensions di¤ers substantially to that fancifully biased of World Bank (2015, p. 156).
7See Annex A for more details.
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Figure 1: E[POil] variable construction
The consensus variable corresponds to E[POil] = [C  D] 
[A B]. Source: Authors elaboration.
In Figure 3, panel B, it is presented the cross correlation between actual and leads observations of the
CF series. As the transformation used for both series corresponds to the annual percentage change, it
is expected that the correlation between the current actual value and the current value of the forecast
of the transformed series should exhibit a high correlation. The results indicate that in e¤ect, the
CF predictions are accurate for the target horizon plus a couple of periods, as a result of oil price
persistence.
In Table 2 there are presented some descriptive statistics of the involved series for the analysed sample
using the preferred stationary transformation. Note that according to the Augmented Dickey-Fuller
test (ADF), the transformations (when applied) deliver stationary series. Also, and in companion with
Figure 2, oil price forecasts exhibit a smoother behaviour than actual values, which might contribute
to both its accuracy and consensus.
3 Results
The results report the outcome of the F -test of global signicance, comprising only the values i of
Equation 1. In concrete terms, it tests the joint null hypothesis H0 : 1 = ::: = px = 0, for each
NH1-3 and ANH given one to six lags of the xt variable. The lag structure of yt is chosen according
to the GETS procedure, allowing skipped terms. These results are reported in "Signicant lags (py)"
row of Table 2. The estimations are made with OLS using Newey and West (1987) HAC standard
deviations.
There are also presented another type of results for robustness purposes. It could be raised as common
knowledge that OPEC nding on inuencing oil prices is episodic. For that reason, and circumscribing
to the econometric methodology used in this article, it is also reported the F -test p-value of the six
lags of the NH1 and NH1 Inverse in a recursive sampling scheme. The rst estimation window sample
comprises the rst 60 observations (2001.1-2005.12) whereas the last includes the full sample (2001.1-
2012.3; 135 obs.) and coincides with the gures reported in corresponding tables. Note that despite
the valuable information that this exercise provides in terms of stability, it is always preferred for a
nite-sample nonparametric-estimation the use of a greater number of observations.
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Figure 2: Time series plot of involved variables
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Figure 3: Graphical forecast accuracy assessment
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the series (*)
POil E[POil] E[POil] GT&N GT&N -O GT&N -NO
Transform. Ann. perc. Ann. perc. Basis points No. events No. events No. events
Mean 18.84 16.26 7.03 1.39 0.49 0.90
Median 17.28 11.58 5.00 1 0 0
Maximum 86.55 80.50 31.00 13 4 10
Minimum -54.65 -39.88 -29.00 0 0 0
Std. deviation 33.66 24.83 8.31 1.86 0.86 1.47
Sign. lags (py) {1;6} {1;6} {1;12} {1;2} {1;2} {1}
ADF Statistic -3.44 -3.04 -3.87 -3.54 -3.47 -8.26
p-value 0.011 0.034 0.003 0.008 0.010 0.000
(*) Sample: 2001.12012.3 (135 obs.). Source: Authors elaboration using data from
Bloomberg, CF, and López and Muñoz (2012).
3.1 Baseline results
The results are reported in Table 3. The rst panel (NH1) shows that the rst and fourth lags of
GT&N Gc oil price are signicant at 10%. If it is considered a 15% level of condence, lags two
and ve turn signicant, leaving just the third lag as not signicant. Note that especially in this
case, the rst lag (px=1) represent the most relevant case. This is because GT&N measure has
the propertyby constructionof being a news shock variable. Hence, it is relevant to nd that at
least the rst lag is signicant (in the original Granger, 1969, sense), while greater lags may have a
bounded impact afterwards news are available. Jointly with this result (GT&N ! POil) it is found
that POil 9 GT&N for any analysed lag.
The second panel provides evidence that GT&N ! E[POil], say, geopolitical tensions a¤ects oil-
price expectations, for all considered lags and at 10% condence level. The opposite hypothesis
E[POil] ! GT&N result as non signicant with one to six lags, suggesting that the considered oil-
producers-related news are already exogenous to forecastersinformation set.
The third panel states that for lags one to three there is evidence suggesting that GT&N ! E[POil],
implying an uncertainty e¤ect into oil-price forecasts. Note that for the opposite hypothesis it is found
Gc with six lags only; a result that should be read carefully. As the rst three lags of GT&N Gc
dispersion, and since six lags of dispersion Gc GT&N the e¤ect can be understood as the time required
for forecasters (3 months) rejoining consensus in their forecasts after gathering news information in a
3-months period. Hence, the rst round e¤ect can still be associated to GT&N a¤ecting E[POil].
The fourth panel exhibits the result for the auxiliary hypothesis POil ! E[POil] and E[POil] 9 POil.
As expected, and in conjunction with Figure 3, CF survey forecasts "behaved well" in terms of
accuracy and expectations formation. Note that these are robust results, with full lags signicance in
one direction and full rejection in the opposite.
The recursive p-value estimation for p=1 in panel A of Figure 4 reveals that these estimations are
robust. As above mentioned, the unexpected nature of these data generating process suggests that the
rst lag is the most relevant. However, with the remaining lags of panels B-D, there is some evidence
supporting the NH1 especially for the period between 2006 and 2010. After 2010 the relation with
more lags is presumably lost because some other external forces are a¤ecting the oil price, for instance,
a global liquidity contraction due to global activity recovery as argued by Ratti and Vespignani (2013).
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Table 3: Granger causality testing results: all events (*)
Baseline model: yt = +
pyP
i=1
iyt i +
pxP
j=1
jxt j + "t; "t  iidN (0; 2")
NH: 1 = ::: = px = 0 (xt 9 yt)
NH1: GT&N ! POil NH1 Inverse: POil ! GT&N
Lags (px) F -stat. p-value R
2
Reg. Infrc. Lags (px) F -stat. p-value R
2
Reg. Infrc.
1 3.606 0.060 0.826 ! 1 0.000 0.989 0.117 9
2 1.988 0.141 0.826 9 2 0.104 0.901 0.112 9
3 1.342 0.263 0.825 9 3 0.073 0.974 0.105 9
4 2.027 0.094 0.825 ! 4 0.444 0.777 0.103 9
5 1.813 0.114 0.824 9 5 0.382 0.861 0.098 9
6 1.547 0.167 0.824 9 6 0.326 0.922 0.091 9
NH2: GT&N ! E[POil] NH2 Inverse: E[POil]! GT&N
Lags (px) F -stat. p-value R
2
Reg. Infrc. Lags (px) F -stat. p-value R
2
Reg. Infrc.
1 4.434 0.037 0.898 ! 1 0.712 0.400 0.120 9
2 4.020 0.020 0.899 ! 2 0.395 0.675 0.116 9
3 2.704 0.048 0.898 ! 3 1.166 0.326 0.119 9
4 2.480 0.047 0.900 ! 4 1.379 0.245 0.117 9
5 1.979 0.086 0.899 ! 5 1.145 0.341 0.109 9
6 1.639 0.142 0.898 9 6 1.372 0.231 0.119 9
NH3: GT&N ! E[POil] NH3 Inverse: E[POil]! GT&N
Lags (px) F -stat. p-value R
2
Reg. Infrc. Lags (px) F -stat. p-value R
2
Reg. Infrc.
1 3.049 0.083 0.160 ! 1 1.007 0.317 0.128 9
2 2.451 0.090 0.176 ! 2 1.657 0.195 0.125 9
3 2.280 0.082 0.172 ! 3 1.238 0.299 0.119 9
4 1.716 0.150 0.167 9 4 1.093 0.363 0.117 9
5 1.398 0.229 0.162 9 5 1.076 0.376 0.112 9
6 1.614 0.149 0.173 9 6 4.307 0.001 0.154 !
Auxiliary NH: POil ! E[POil] Auxiliary NH Inverse: E[POil]! POil
Lags (px) F -stat. p-value R
2
Reg. Infrc. Lags (px) F -stat. p-value R
2
Reg. Infrc.
1 8.354 0.004 0.918 ! 1 0.569 0.452 0.843 9
2 16.151 0.000 0.933 ! 2 0.932 0.396 0.843 9
3 12.219 0.000 0.934 ! 3 0.646 0.587 0.841 9
4 9.810 0.000 0.934 ! 4 0.466 0.760 0.844 9
5 7.959 0.000 0.933 ! 5 0.836 0.526 0.844 9
6 6.721 0.000 0.934 ! 6 0.715 0.638 0.844 9
(*) OLS estimations with Newey-West HAC standard errors. Sample: 2001.12012.3 (135 obs.).
p-value: bold<10%; italics>10%. Source: Authors elaboration.
Nevertheless, Figure 5 for NH1 Inverse is bolder about to not reject the underlying hypothesis of
non-signicant parameters; in some sense playing in favour of NH1.
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Figure 4: Recursive estimation of NH1 p-value: all events (*)
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(*) Horizontal line: p-value=10%. Source: Authors elaboration.
Figure 5: Recursive estimation of NH1 Inverse p-value: all events (*)
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(*) Horizontal line: p-value=10%. Source: Authors elaboration.
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3.2 Robustness results
3.2.1 Purely OPEC news
The results using the purely-OPEC version of the GT&N variableGT&N -Oare presented in Table
4. The rst and second panel show that there is no Gc from GT&N -O to POil and to E[POil] at
conventional levels of condence. Nevertheless, the evidence is inconclusive as there is no Gc in reverse
direction also.
The third panel, however, indicate bidirectional Gc between GT&N -O and E[POil] for all considered
lags at conventional levels of condence. This result supports the claimat least, do not reject it
that GT&N -O already measure unexpected news of OPEC oil production. These news Gc forecasters
dispersion as well as uncertainty in future oil prices lead to signicant disruptions in OPECs countries
oil production.
Table 4: Granger causality testing results: OPEC events (*)
NH1: GT&N -O ! POil NH1 Inverse: POil ! GT&N -O
Lags (px) F -stat. p-value R
2
Reg. Infrc. Lags (px) F -stat. p-value R
2
Reg. Infrc.
1 1.818 0.180 0.826 9 1 0.154 0.695 0.051 9
2 1.130 0.326 0.825 9 2 0.163 0.850 0.046 9
3 0.896 0.445 0.824 9 3 0.261 0.853 0.041 9
4 0.686 0.603 0.823 9 4 0.325 0.861 0.037 9
5 0.585 0.712 0.822 9 5 0.284 0.921 0.030 9
6 0.496 0.811 0.821 9 6 0.243 0.961 0.023 9
NH2: GT&N -O ! E[POil] NH2 Inverse: E[POil]! GT&N -O
Lags (px) F -stat. p-value R
2
Reg. Infrc. Lags (px) F -stat. p-value R
2
Reg. Infrc.
1 1.330 0.251 0.897 9 1 0.063 0.802 0.052 9
2 0.841 0.434 0.896 9 2 0.183 0.833 0.053 9
3 0.556 0.645 0.896 9 3 1.436 0.235 0.065 9
4 0.456 0.768 0.895 9 4 1.552 0.191 0.064 9
5 0.504 0.773 0.895 9 5 1.639 0.155 0.065 9
6 0.762 0.601 0.895 9 6 1.397 0.222 0.083 9
NH3: GT&N -O ! E[POil] NH3 Inverse: E[POil]! GT&N -O
Lags (px) F -stat. p-value R
2
Reg. Infrc. Lags (px) F -stat. p-value R
2
Reg. Infrc.
1 5.477 0.021 0.181 ! 1 7.976 0.005 0.086 !
2 3.326 0.039 0.200 ! 2 7.099 0.001 0.088 !
3 3.689 0.014 0.197 ! 3 4.576 0.004 0.083 !
4 2.878 0.025 0.195 ! 4 5.361 0.001 0.098 !
5 2.816 0.019 0.193 ! 5 5.014 0.000 0.100 !
6 3.459 0.003 0.220 ! 6 3.502 0.003 0.107 !
(*) OLS estimations with Newey-West HAC standard errors. Sample: 2001.12012.3 (135 obs.).
p-value: bold<10%; italics>10%. Source: Authors elaboration.
Note that, following the description of the GT&N variable in Annex A, the events purely related to
OPEC are particularly related to oil production in contrast to the remaining dummies accounting
for political instability and other externalities. The fact that results are robust to the whole set
of hypothesis using the combined measure, indicates that the joint interaction of these unexpected
events shape the forces that utterly inuence oil price.
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Figure 6: Recursive estimation of NH1 p-value: OPEC events (*)
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(*) Horizontal line: p-value=10%. Source: Authors elaboration.
Figure 7: Recursive estimation of NH1 Inverse p-value: OPEC events (*)
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(*) Horizontal line: p-value=10%. Source: Authors elaboration.
The recursive p-value estimations are presented in Figure 6 for NH1. In this case, it is found a plain
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non-rejection of the NH1 across the sample and lags (panels A-D). Same result is basically found with
NH1 Inverse in Figure 7 (especially since 2007). Hence, the results using the purely OPEC measure,
in conjunction with results of Figures 4 and 5, lead to think that it is a mixture of geopolitical tensions
plus OPEC news that jointly inuence oil price, instead of an isolated OPEC behaviour.
3.2.2 Non OPEC news
The results using the non OPEC version of the GT&N variableGT&N -NOare presented in Table
5. Except for two isolated cases (NH2: px=2 and NH3 Inverse: px=6) there is not found Gc in
any direction at conventional signicance levels. This nding reinforces the hypothesis that OPEC in
conjunction with geopolitical tensions a¤ects oil price, but not any of these two variables by itself.
Table 5: Granger causality test results: non-OPEC events (*)
NH1: GT&N -NO ! POil NH1 Inverse: POil ! GT&N -NO
Lags (px) F -stat. p-value R
2
Reg. Infrc. Lags (px) F -stat. p-value R
2
Reg. Infrc.
1 1.858 0.175 0.825 9 1 0.043 0.837 0.090 9
2 1.162 0.316 0.825 9 2 0.658 0.519 0.086 9
3 0.766 0.515 0.824 9 3 0.454 0.715 0.080 9
4 1.294 0.275 0.824 9 4 0.770 0.546 0.077 9
5 1.820 0.113 0.823 9 5 0.812 0.543 0.073 9
6 1.692 0.127 0.823 9 6 0.677 0.668 0.065 9
NH2: GT&N -NO ! E[POil] NH2 Inverse: E[POil]! GT&N -NO
Lags (px) F -stat. p-value R
2
Reg. Infrc. Lags (px) F -stat. p-value R
2
Reg. Infrc.
1 2.722 0.102 0.898 9 1 1.795 0.183 0.099 9
2 2.905 0.059 0.899 ! 2 1.064 0.348 0.090 9
3 1.896 0.134 0.898 9 3 1.428 0.238 0.086 9
4 1.946 0.107 0.898 9 4 1.277 0.283 0.080 9
5 1.668 0.148 0.897 9 5 1.032 0.402 0.073 9
6 1.446 0.203 0.897 9 6 1.396 0.222 0.067 9
NH3: GT&N -NO ! E[POil] NH3 Inverse: E[POil]! GT&N -NO
Lags (px) F -stat. p-value R
2
Reg. Infrc. Lags (px) F -stat. p-value R
2
Reg. Infrc.
1 1.099 0.296 0.139 9 1 0.316 0.575 0.094 9
2 1.725 0.182 0.142 9 2 0.433 0.649 0.090 9
3 1.165 0.326 0.138 9 3 0.353 0.787 0.062 9
4 0.900 0.466 0.131 9 4 0.304 0.875 0.075 9
5 0.728 0.604 0.126 9 5 0.334 0.891 0.068 9
6 0.668 0.676 0.122 9 6 2.903 0.011 0.109 !
(*) OLS estimations with Newey-West HAC standard errors. Sample: 2001.12012.3 (135 obs.).
p-value: bold<10%; italics>10%. Source: Authors elaboration.
The recursive p-value results for NH1 are presented in Figure 8. It is basically found the same situation
across the di¤erent lags: signicance through mid-2010 to then rise above the 10% condence level
threshold. This nding supports the view that at least between 2006 and 2010 non-OPEC events
may play a role into determining oil prices. This situation may be reinforced when analysing the
results of Figure 9 especially with the rst and second lag, clearly showing a no rejection the NH1
Inverse. The results with the full sample suggest that especially since mid-2010, non-OPEC news are
not inuencing oil price separated to OPECs behaviour.
These results are in line with the ndings of Bittlingmayer (2005) obtained for a previous sample,
when suggesting that war risk is enough to cause price disruptions since traders mark up price to
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cover expectation of possible scarcity.
Figure 8: Recursive estimation of NH1 p-value: non-OPEC events (*)
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(*) Horizontal line: p-value=10%. Source: Authors elaboration.
Figure 9: Recursive estimation of NH1 Inverse p-value: non-OPEC events (*)
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(*) Horizontal line: p-value=10%. Source: Authors elaboration.
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4 Concluding remarks
To what extent geopolitical tensions in major oil-producer countries and unexpected news related to
the OPEC a¤ect global oil price? By means of Gc I provide evidence favouring OPEC countries-
related news as an oil price driver jointly with supply disruptions, inuencing short-term forecasts,
and reducing the consensus when unanticipated news are available.
These results are obtained when considering all kinds of events in GT&N measure: geopolitical
tensions and OPEC-related news. When considering just OPEC-related news, the results show bidi-
rectional causality between GT&N and expectations dispersion only. Moreover, when considering
the GT&N measure excluding the OPEC-related events, all results are spoiled out carrying incon-
clusive results. Hence, the nding of OPEC as an oil-price driver while statistically signicant in
the baseline specication may not be considered as a robust one. Some similar qualitative results
are found in Smith (2005), Alhajji and Huettner (2000) for the 1973-94 period for OPEC behaviour,
and Almoguera, Douglas, and Herrera (2011). The fact that results are robust to the whole set of
hypothesis using the combined measure and whole sample, indicates that the joint interaction of these
unexpected events shape the forces that utterly inuence oil price.
These results are important since oil has been long-standing important commodity worldwide for an
incommensurable number of reasons. Large uctuations of its price are associated with detrimental
welfare e¤ects for both producers and consumers. Further research may consider a forecasting model
for the GT&N variable (and its components) alongside an analysis of a more ample spectrum of
news that may indirectly a¤ect oil market. A special candidate series are those related to politic
developments surrounding OPEC members, and other oil producers such as Russia and the US.
This article suggests that in order to keep track of price dynamics, it is recommended to follow
geopolitical tensions and the coordinated actions of the associated major producers. This task is easier
said than done, since it relies on non-market signals and other externalities that are not necessarily
based on a purely economics-based logic.
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A GT&N variable description
In this annex, there are provided some extended descriptions of the ten dummy variables used into the
construction of the GT&N couple of variables. It basically constitutes a redenition and translation
of the database description provided in López and Muñoz (2012) (there are provided some Wikipedia
entries links for reference). A graph of the ten variables is presented in Figure A1.
1. UN Oil for Food Program (1995-2003). Programme developed by UN established in 1995
as a response to Iraqis citizen claims a¤ected by economic sanctions imposed in the aftermath of
Gulf War in 1991. The programme allows to Iraq sell petroleum in world markets in exchange
of food, medicines, and other humanitarian help, aiming to bind Iraqi military capacity. The
programme nishes in 2003. The events referred to this programme are UN resolutions on Iraqi
global oil market quotas, similar to the impact of new discoveries (Wikipedia).
2. US relations with Libya and Iran (1996-2004). Events considered in this category are
related to sanctions act imposed to Iran and Libya promulgated in 1996. This act imposes
economic sanctions for entrepreneurial-kind relations with Iran and Libya. The programme
constitutes a response to the nuclear agenda and support provided to Iran to certain terrorist
associations (Hezbolla, Hammas, and Jihad). In 19 December, 2003, Libya announces its inten-
tion to leave the nuclear programme as well as massive destruction weapons development and
the beginning of a new era of cooperation with the US (Wikipedia: Libya and Iran).
3. Iraq War and post-war period (2003-2011). News related to the US invasion to Iraq in
March 2003, and Saddam Hussein capture in December 2003. Also includes events related to
the installation of the provisional government in Iraq and reestablishment of Iraqs international
a¤airs ( Wikipedia).
4. Iran post Iraq War (start in 2005). Accounts for events related to justied hearsays
of the re-establishment of a nuclear career during the administration of President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad starting in August 2005 (Wikipedia).
5. Terrorist attacks. Constitutes events referred to terrorist attacks to productive installations in
the Middle East, or terrorist targets. 9/11 attacks are included within this category (Wikipedia).
6. Lebanon War (2006). Also referred as Israel-Hezbolla War o July War, is a 34-days-long con-
ict occurred in Lebanon spanning from 12 July to 14 August, 2006; after a ceasere statement
of the UN. The conict has a de facto end in 8 September, 2006 when Israel unblocks maritime
restrictions over Lebanon ( Wikipedia).
7. Arab Spring (2011). Constitute waves of anti-government demonstrations and strikes in Arab
countries starting in 18 December, 2010 in Tunisia. Governments of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and
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Yemen were overthrown. Civilian demonstrations were performed in Bahrain and Syria; massive
movements strikes in Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, and Oman; minor events were
adverted also in Lebanon, Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Western Sahara (Wikipedia).
8. Use of the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve. The Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) is
worlds greatest for-emergency reserve of oil, which capacity achieves more than 700 millions of
barrels. This variable accounts for the US announcements on sales with stabilisation purposes
or domestic emergencies. An in-depth and up-to-date analysis in regard of the use of SPR can
be found in Demirer and Kutan (2010) (Wikipedia).
9. New announcements on discoveries, and site exploration. News related to oilelds
discoveries, explorations, and strategic alliances between rms in order to exploit Middle East
oilelds.
10. Purely OPEC announcements. Announcements on OPECs quotas reassignment or major
maintenance works. This variable by itself constitutes the GT&N -O measure. In contrast, the
sum of the previous nine constitutes GT&N -NO.
Figure A1: GT&N variable composition: all events
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Source: Authors elaboration using data from López and Muñoz (2012).
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